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Transfer of jurisdiction refers to the process by which a 
juvenile court relinquishes jurisdiction and transfers a 
juvenile case to the criminal courts for prosecution. This 
process, variously described as waiver, certification, or 
bind-over, has been a unique part of the juvenile court 
system since the establishment of the first juvenile court. 
See Kemplen v Maryland, 428 F(2d) 169, 173 (4th Cir 
1970) ("There is no proceeding for adults comparable 
directly to the juvenile jurisdiction waiver hearing."). 
Although virtually all jurisdictions permit transfer, the 
criteria and procedures for transfer vary from state to 
state. See IJA-ABA Standards Relating to Transfer Be-
tween Courts (1980) [hereinafter cited as_IJA-ABA Stan-
dards]; S. Davis, Rights of Juveniles ch 4 (2d ed 1980}. 
The concept of transfer entails an implicit recognition 
that the juvenile court system should not be available to 1 all children: 
/ Some acts are so offensive to the community that the ar-
bitrary line drawn at eighteen cannot acceptably be used to 
protect the alleged wrongdoer. The serious offender should 
not be permitted to escape the criminal justice system simp-
ly because he or she is a day or a year short of eighteen. As 
age eighteen approaches, credible argument can be made 
that the juvenile court's always inadequate resources should 
not be devoted to those youthful wrongdoers whose of-
fenses are so serious or who appear to be so incorrigible as 
to be unworthy of or beyond help. IJA-ABA Standards at 3. 
See also In re Mack, .22 App(2d) 201, 203, 260 NE(2d} 
619, 620-21 (1970) ("The purpose of [transfer] is to protect 
the public in those cases where rehabilitation appears 
unlikely and circumstances indicate that if the charge is 
ultimately established society would be better served by 
the criminal process by reason of the greater security 
which may be achieved or the deterring effect which that 
process is thought to accomplish."). 
This view of transfer proceedings is not universally ac-
cepted: "Others argue that the existence of this loophole 
[transfer] in the juvenile system indicates a half-hearted 
commitment to treatment and a continued allegiance to 
retribution on the part of society, an allegiance that is 
particularly distasteful because it applies to the very per-
sons whom the separate juvenile court system was de-
signed to protect." P. Piersma, J. Ganousis, A. Volenik, H. 
Swanger & P. Connell, Law and Tactics in Juvenile Cases 
274 (3d ed 1977}. 
In Ohio, transfer proceedings are governed by RC 
2151.26 and Juvenile Rule 30. See State v Adams, 69 
OS(2d) 120, 123,431 NE(2d} 326, 329 (1982} ("R.C. 
2151.26 and Juv. R. 30 provide the procedural mechan-
ism by which a juvenile offender may be 'bound over' to 
the adult court .... "). Juvenile courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction over persons under the age of 18 who are 
charged with criminal conduct. RC 2151.23(A}(1). Only a 
properly transferred juvenile may be prosecuted in the 
criminal courts. As one court has stated: "Failure to com-
ply with the provisions of R.C. 2151.26 ... deprives the 
Court of Common Pleas of jurisdiction over a juvenile 
defendant.'' State v Riggins, 68 App(2d} 1, 4, 426 N E(2d} 
504, 507 (1980}. A prosecution in criminal court on the 
mistaken belief that the child was over 18 at the time of 
the offe.nse is a "nullity." RC 2151.26(E). Generally, a 
hearing is required before a child can be transferred to 
the criminal courts. However, there is one situation in 
which a transfer hearing is not required. RC 2151.26(G) 
provides that a child who has been transferred and con-
victed and who is subsequently charged with aggravated 
murder, murder, an aggravated felony of the first or se-
cond degree, or a felony of the first or second degree 
shall be prosecuted as an adult. 
Constitutional considerations also affect transfer pro-
cedures. In Kent v. United States, 383 US 541 (1966), the 
U.S. Supreme Court considered a challenge to transfer 
proceedings conducted pursuant to the D.C. Code. Kent 
was taken into custody for rape. As a 16 year old, he was 
subject to juvenile court jurisdiction. The juvenile court, 
however, transferred his case for trial as an adult. The 
transfer was accomplished without a hearing or written 
reasons. In addition, the court failed to provide Kent's at-
torney with access to Kent's social service file. On review, 
the Supreme Court held that the transfer proceedings 
were invalid. According to the Court, transfer is a "criti-
cally important," id. at 556, stage of the juvenile process 
and "there is no place in our system of law for reaching 
a result of such tremendous consequences without 
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ceremony-without hearing, without effective assistance 
of couris~el,-wlttiout a sfatement'ofreason-S:''-/(f"af554. 
See generallyPaulsen, Kent v. United States: The Consti-
tutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 The Supreme 
Court Review 16i . 
Whether the Court intended to rest its decision in Kent 
on statutory cir constitutional grounds is not entirely clear. 
At one point in the opinion, Justice Fortas wrote: "The 
Juvenile Court Act and the decisions of the United States 
Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia Circuit pro-
vide an adequate basis for decision of this case, and we 
go no further." /d. at 556. Moreover, the dissenting 
Justices believed the case involvedonly.astatutory 
issue. /d. at 568 ("This case involves the construction of 
a statute applicable only to the District of Columbia."). 
Neverthele.§s, gtl"l~r g_art§ gJ !h~_fo,rtftsgpj1Jiprtin9icate a 
constitutional basis, One passage ree1ds: "We. b~lieve 
that this result is required by the statute read In the con-
text of constitutional principles relating to due process 
and the assistance of counsel:'ld. at 557. hi another 
passage hewr()tethat a transfer hearing ''must measure 
up to tlie essentials of dlle- processa'n!Halttl"eatment." 
/d. at 562. Significantly, the Court quoted this passage in 
In re Gault, 387 US 1 (1967): "We reiterate this view ... 
as a requir~ment which is part of theDue Process 
Clause of the. Fourteenth Amendmentof our Constitu-
tion." /d. at 30-31. 
Although there are some exceptions, most courts view 
Kent as establishing constitutional standards. For exam-
ple, the Third Circuit has stated: ii[l]tls our view that 
Kent, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's subse-
quent opinion in In re Gault ... sets forth certain prin-
ciples of-constitutional dimension}'Unit~d States ex rei 
TurnerVRlin111~"43f3 f(~a}839, B/tr42=(aH tTfl971). 
Accord Geboy v Gray, 471 F(2d) 575, 579 (7th Cir 1973); 
Powell v H()()ker, 4,53 F(2d)-652; S54(~nti,eir-'19!1y,-over-
ruled on other grounds, Harris v Procunier, 498 F(2d) 576 
(9th Cir 1974); Kemp!en v Maryland, 428 F(2d) 169 (4th 
Cir 1970); lnge v Slayton, 395 F. Supp 560, 564-65 (ED Va 
1975), appeal dismissed, 541 F(2d) 277 (4th Cir 1976). But 
see State v Steinbauer, 216 So(2d) 214, 217-18 (Fia 1968), 
cert. denied,398 US 914 (1970); lnreBulla,rd,22NC App 
245, 248, 206 SE(2d) 305, 307, aP,pea/ dismissed, 285 NC 
758, 209 SE(2d) 279 (1974); Cradle v, Peytori, 208 Va 243, 
246, 156 SE(2d) 874, 877, cert, .denied, ~92 Uq 945 (1967). 
The Ohio Courts treat Kent as a constitutional case. 
See State v Adams, 69 OS(2d) 120, 127 nA, 431 NE(2d) 
326,331 n.~(19f32); Statev Qviedo, 5,~pp(~cl)168, 170, 5 
OBR 351, 353, 450 NE(2d) 700, 703 (1982); State v Rig-
gins, 68 App(2d) 1, 6, 426 NE(2d) 504,508 (1980); In re 
Mack, 22 App(2d) 201, 203, 260 NE(2d) 619, 621 (1970}. 
JUVENILES SUBJECT TO TRANSFER 
RC 2151.26 and Juvenile Rule 30 specify which 
children are subject to transfer and what criteria apply. 
Transfer is permitted only for juveniles of specified ages 
and for certain types of offenses. In addition, the court 
must find that there is probable cause to believe that the 
child has committed the offense and that he is not amen-
able to treatment in the juvenile system. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to consider the con-
stitutionality of the standards used in transfer proceed-
ings. In Breed v. Jones, 421 US 519 (1975}, the Court 
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commented that it "has never attempted to prescribe 
criteria for, or the nature and quantum of evidence that 
must support, a decision to transfer a juvenile for trial in 
adult court." /d. at 537. Constitutional challenges to trans-
fer statutes typically have been based on vagueness 
grounds, but these challenges generally have been re- f 
jected. E.g., Speck v. Auger, 558 F(2d) 394 (8th Cir.}, cert. 
denied, 434 US 999 (1977} (construing the Iowa statute}; 
Donald L v Superior Court, 7 Cal(3d) 592, 601, 498 P(2d} 
1098, 1104, 102 Cal Rptr 850, 856 (1972}; Davis v State, 
297 So(2d) 289, 291-93 (Fia 1974}; State v Gibbs, 94 
Idaho 908, 916, 500 P(2d} 209, 217 (1972); State v 
Smagula, 117 NH 663, 669, 377 A(2d) 608, 612 (1977}; In 
re Bullard, 22 NC App 245, 247-48, 206 SE(2d) 305, 307, 
appeal dismissed, 285 NC 758, 209 SE(2d} 279 (1974). 
But see State ex rei Hunter, 387 So(2d) 1086, 1090 (La 
1980}. 
Age 
A child 15 years or older may be transferred to the 
criminal courts for trial. RC 2151.26(A}(1}; Juv A 30(A). 
Accordingly, children under 15 years of age are not sub-
ject to transfer, regardless of the crime charged. The 
child's age at the time of the offense, rather than at the 
time of the transfer hearing, controls. 
Offenses 
Transfer is permitted only if the complaint alleges that 
the child has committed an act that would constitute a 
felony if committed by an adult. RC 2151.26(A); Juv R 
30(A). There are no common law crimes in Ohio-only 
statutory crimes. RC 2901.03(A}. An offense specifically 
classified as a felony in the Revised Code is a felony 
regardless of the penalty which may be imposed. RC 4 
2901.02(D). Similarly, an offense classified as a misde-
meanor is a misdemeanor regardless of the penalty 
which may be imposed. /d. Any offense not specifically 
classified is a felony if imprisonment for more than one 
year may be imposed as a penalty. RC 2901.02(E). 
Probable Cause 
Before a child may be transferred, the court must find 
that there is probable cause to beli.eve that he has com-
mitted the alleged act. RC 2151.26(A}(2}; Juv A 30(A}. 
There must be probable cause (1) that a felony has been 
committed and (2} that the child is the person who has 
committed that felony. See generally IJA-ABA Standards 
37-38; Davis, The Efficacy of a Probable Cause Require-
ment in Juvenile Proceedings, 59 NC L Rev 723 (1981}. 
Amenability to Treatment 
Before a child may be transferred, the court must find 
that there are reasonable grounds to believe (1} that he is 
not amenable to care or rehabilitation or further care or 
rehabilitation in any facility for delinquent juveniles and 
(2} that the safety of the community may require legal 
restraint for a period extending beyond his majority. RC 
2151.26(A}(3}; Juv A 30(C}. 
Juvenile Rule 30(E) requires the court to consider the 
following factors in determining whether a child is amen-
able to treatment: 
(1} Age. See State v Tilton, No. 384 (7th Dist Ct App, • 
Harrison, 6-23-83} (due to the maturity of the child, he '· 
would not be amenable to treatment as a juvenile}; State 
v Holt, No. 81AP-661 (10th Dist Ct App, Franklin, 3-30-82} 
(18 years old at time of trial}; 
(2) Mental and physical health; 
(3) Prior juvenile record. See State v Carter, 27 OS(2d) 
135, 138, 272 NE(2d) 119, 121 (1971) ("many court ap-
pearances"); State v Whiteside, 6 App(3d) 30, 35, 6 OBR 
140, 145, 452 NE(2d) 332, 338 (1982) ("appellant had a 
record as a juvenile delinquent"); State v Oviedo, 5 
App(3d) 168, 171,5 OBR 351,354,450 NE(2d) 700, 704 
0982) ("history of delinquency ... included such 
charges as petty theft, breaking and entering, receiving 
stolen property, theft, criminal mischief and criminal 
damaging."). 
(4) Previous efforts to treat or rehabilitate. See State v 
Carter, 27 OS(2d) 135, 138, 272 NE(2d) 119, 121 (1971) 
(prior commitment to correctional school); State v 
Whiteside, 6 App(3d) 30, 35, 6 OBR 140, 145, 452 NE(2d) 
332, 338 (1982) (prior treatment at the Ohio Youth Com-
mission); State v Oviedo, 5 App(3d) 168, 171, 5 OBR 351, 
354,450 NE(2d) 700, 704 (1982) (prior probation); State v 
Ridgley, No L-80-241 (6th Dist Ct App, Lucas, 3-27-81) (4 
prior commitments to Ohio Youth Commission); 
(5) Family environment. See State v Hawkins, No. 3462 
(9th Dist Ct App, Lorain, 6-8-83) (unstable family situa-
tion); State v Arnold, No. L-80-269 (6th Dist Ct App, 
Lucas, 6-12-81) (family had a long history of antisocial 
behavior and criminal activity); and 
(6) School record. See State v Hawkins, No 3462 (9th 
Dist Ct App, Lorain, 6-8-83} (suspended from school 
eight times}; State v Arnold, No. L-80-269 (6th Dist Ct 
App, Lucas, 6-12-81) (truancy problem and not currently 
attending school}. 
Although the juvenile court must consider all of these 
factors, "not all of the relevant factors need be resolved 
against the juvenile in order to justify the transfer .... " 
State v Oviedo, 5 App(2d) 168, 171,5 OBR 351,354-55, 
450 NE(2d) 700, 705 (1982). In evaluating the "safety of 
the community," the court may consider the nature of the 
offense, the existence of aggravating circumstances, and 
the extent of any apparent pattern of antisocial conduct. 
/d. at 171-72. See also State v Carter, 27 OS(2d) 135, 136, 
272 NE(2d) 119, 120 (1971) ijuvenile court cited aggra-
vated character of offense-armed robbery-in the 
transfer order). RC 2151.26(8) requires the court to con-
sider whether the victim of the alleged offense was 65 
years of age or older or was permanently or totally dis-
abled at the time of the offense. See State v Grooms, No 
374 (4th Dist Ct App, Adams, 9-3-81) (78 year old victim}. 
One survey of juvenile court judges revealed that the 
following factors, in the order of the frequency of their 
listing, were considered in making transfer decisions: 
(1) seriousness of the alleged offense; 
(2) record and history of the juvenile, including prior con-
tacts with police, court, or other official agencies; 
(3) aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner in 
which the offense was committed; 
(4) sophistication, maturity, emotional attitude of the 
juvenile; 
(5) proximity of juvenile's age to maximum age of juvenile 
court jurisdiction; 
(6) existence of more appropriate procedures, services, 
and facilities in the adult court that would increase the 
likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation; 
(7) the possible need for a longer period of incarceration; 
(8) existence of evidence sufficient for a grand jury 
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indictment; 
(9) the trial of the juvenile's associates in the alleged 
offense in an adult court; 
(10) other factors; 
(11) effect of transfer on public's respect for law 
enforcement and law compliance; 
(12) community attitude toward the specific offense. 
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the 
Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Juvenile 
Delinquency and Youth Crime 78 appendix (1967). See 
also Note, Waiver of Jurisdiction in Juvenile Courts, 30 
Ohio St LJ 132 (1969) (surveying factors Ohio juvenile 
judges used in making transfer determinations under 
prior statute). 
The IJA-ABA Standards adopt a restrictive approach to 
transfer, permitting it only for "extraordinary juveniles in 
extraordinary factual circumstances." IJA-ABA Standards 
at 39. The criteria for transfer are: (1) the seriousness of 
the offense, (2) prior record of adjudicated delinquency 
involving the infliction or threat of significant bodily injury, 
(3) the likely inefficacy of the dispositions available to the 
juvenile court as demonstrated by previous dispositions 
of the juvenile, and (4) the appropriateness of the serv-
ices and dispositional alternative available in the criminal 
justice system for dealing with the juvenile's problems, 
and whether they are, in fact, available./d. (emphasis 
added). The Standards reject "the public interest as a 
justification for waiver." /d. at 40. 
PROCEDURE 
Hearing and Investigation 
In Ohio RC 2151.26 and Rule 30 govern the transfer 
hearing and investigation. In Kent the Supreme Court 
held that "an opportunity for a hearing which may be in-
formal, must be given the child prior to entry of a waiver 
order." 383 U.S. at 561. In explaining the hearing require-
ment, the Court wrote: "We do not mean by this to in-
dicate that the hearing to be held must conform with all of 
the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual 
administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hearing 
must mea:;;ure up to the essentials of due process and 
fair treatment." /d. at 562. 
Rule 30 establishes a two-step hearing procedure. 
First, a preliminary hearing is held to determine whether 
there is probable cause to believe the child has commit-
ted a felony. The child, the prosecutor, or the court may 
move lor a preliminary hearing. See United States v 
Williams, 459 F(2d) 903, 908-09 (2d Cir 1972) (child 
should be advised of his right to be proceeded against as 
a juvenile and of all the consequences of waiving that 
right). If the court finds probable cause, the proceedings 
are continued until a full investigation is completed, at 
which time a second hearing is held to determine 
whether jurisdiction should be transferred to the criminal 
courts. 
The focus of the second hearing is the amenability of 
the child to rehabilitation in the juvenile court system. A 
social history may be prepared and used for this pur-
pose. Juv R 32(A)(2). The "full investigation" required by 
the rule and statute also includes a mental and physical 
examination by a public or private agency or other quali-
fied person. This examination may be waived by the 
juvenile, and refusal to submit to the examination 
·constitutes a waiver. RC 2151.26(C) (waiver must be 
"competently and intelligently made"); Juv R 30{F). 
Although the mental and physical examinations may be 
waived, neither the investigation nor the hearing may be 
waived. State v Newton, No. F-82-17 (6th Dist Ct App, 
Fulton, 6-10-83). 
Right to Counsel 
Juvenile Rule 4(A) provides for the right to counsel at 
all juvenile court hearings. See also RC 2151.352. The 
right to counsel at transfer hearings is also constitutional-
ly required. See Geboy v Gray, 471 F(2d) 575, 579 (7th Cir 
1973); Kemplen v Maryland, 428 F(2d) 169, 175 (4th Cir 
1970); lnge VSiaytcfn·, 39S'ESup"f:f560;·566'(EDVa 1975}, 
appeal dismissed, 541 F(2d) 277 (4th Cir 1976); James v 
Cox, 323 F. Supp 15, 20 (ED Va 1971); Steinhauer v State, 
206 So(2d) 25, 27 (Fia 1968), cert. denied, 398 US 914 
(1970). In Kent the U.S. Supreme Court stated that "coun-
sel must be afforded to the child in waiver proceedings," 
383 US at 562-63, and that "there is no place in our. 
system of law forreaching a result of such tremendous 
consequences ..• without effective assistance of 
counsel .... " /d. at 554. 
Rule 4(A) also provides that in the case of indigency, 
the child has the right to appointed counsel. See also RC 
2151.352. This right is also constitutionally required. 
Kemplen v Maryland, 428F(2d) 169, 175 (4th Cir 1970). In 
criminal trials the Sixth Amendment _right to counsel in-
cludes the right to appointed counsel for indigent defen-
dants. See Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335 (1963); 
Argersinger v Hamlin, 407 US 25 (1972); Scott v Illinois, 
440 US 367 (1977). In Gault the court held that the ap-
pointment of counse.l is required in a delinquency ad-
judicationifthecbild.is "unable to afford to employ 
counsel." 387 US at 42. -
Usually, the rightto co.uns.el maybewaived.ln Qhio, 
however, the right to counsel at a transfer hearing may 
· not be waived. Juvenile Rule 3 provides that a child's 
"right to be represented by counsel at a hearing to de-
termine whether the juvenile court shall relinquish its 
jurisdiction for purposes of criminal prosecution may not 
be waived." 
The right to counsel includes the right to effective 
assistance of counsel. This is the rule regarding the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Strickland v. 
Washington, 104 S Ct 2052 (1984) (Sixth Amendment re-
quires reasonably effective assistance of counsel). The 
Supreme Court's references to "effective assistance" of 
counsel in Kent indicates that the same rule applies to 
the due process right of counsel in transfer proceedings. 
383 US at 558. See Geboy v Gray, 471 F(2d) 575 (7th Cir 
1973) (noting counsel showed a "notable lack of zeal" in 
attempting to find alternatives to transfer). 
The function of counsel at a transfer hearing is to 
challenge the evidence offered by the prosecution and to 
adduce evidence that the child is amenable to treatment 
in the juvenile system. As the Supreme Court noted in 
Kent: "If the staff's submissions include materials which 
are susceptible to challenge or impeachment, it is pre-
cisely the role of counsel to 'denigrate' such matter." 383 
US at 563. Another court has commented: "The child's 
advocate should search for a plan, or perhaps a range of 
plans, which may persuade the court that the welfare of 
the child and the safety of the community can be served 
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without waiver." Haziel v United States, 404 F(2d) 1275, 
1279 (DC Cir 1968). See also IJA-ABA: Standards Relating 
to Counsel for Private Parties 161-68 (1980); Feld, Juve-
nile Court Legislative Reform and the Serious Young 
Offender: Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal," 65 Minn 
L Rev 167, 224-30 (1980). 
Notice 
Juvenile Rule 30(8) requires that written notice of the 
time, place and nature of the transfer heating be given to 
the parties at least three days prior to the hearing. See 
also RC 2151.26(D) (notice to parents or guardian and 
counsel). Adequate notice is an essential aspect of due 
process~See WolffvMcDohnell;418 US 539, 564 {1974) 
(prison disciplinary hearings); Morrissey v Brewer, 408 
US 471, 489 (1972) (parole revocation hearings). Notice 
must be given sufficiently in advance ofthe hearing to 
permit adequate preparation. See Geboy v Gray, 471 
F(2d) 575, 578-79 (7th Cir 1973); Kemplen v Maryland, 
428 F(2d) 169, 175 (4th Cir 1970); Miller.v Quatsoe, 332 F. 
Supp 1269, 1276 (ED Wis 1971). See also In re Gault, 387 
US 1, 33 (1967) ("Notice, to complywith due process re-
quirements, must be given sufficiently in advance of 
scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable 
opportunity to prepare will be afforded .... :'). 
Notice also must be sufficiently specific to appraise 
the parties of the nature of the charges. See United 
States ex rei Turner v Rundle, 438 F(2d) 839, 842 (3d Cir 
1971). See also In re Gault, 387 US 1, 33 (1967) ("Notice, 
to comply with due process requirements ... must set 
forth the alleged misconduct with particularity."). More-
over, it must indicate the purpose of the hearing. See 
James v Cox •• 323F. Supp 15; 20 (ED Va 1981); State v 
Gibbs, 941daho 908,914-15, 500 P{2d) 209,215-16 (1972). 
Finally, the proper parties must receive notice. See Miller 
v Ouat~ge, :33gf.§l)J>.pJ?§!:}!J.276,(J::DyYis 1971); 
Crandellv State, 539 P(2d) 398,401 (Okla Grim App 
1975). 
Standard of Proof 
Juvenile Rule 30(C) requires the court to find reasona-
ble grounds to believe that the child is not amenable to 
rehabilitation and that the safety o.f the community may 
require legal restraint beyond the child's majority. See 
also RC 2151.26(A)(3). commenting on this standard, the 
Ohio Supreme Court has written:"[T)he 'investigation' is 
not required to ~how That Hie child cannot be rehabili-
tated as a juvenile but only that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that he cannot be rehabilitated." State 
v Carmichael, 35 OS(2d) 1, 6, 298 NE(2d) 568, 572 (1973}, 
cert. denied, 414 US 1161 (1974). The Court also held that 
the juvenile court has "considerable latitude within which 
to determine whether it should retain jurisdiction." /d. 
(syllabus 1 & 2). See also State v Whiteside, 6 App(3d) 
30, 452 NE(2d) 332 (1982). 
In other jurisdictions, the standard of proof on the issue 
of nonamenabilityvaries. Some jurisdictions require 
"substantial evidence," while others require a "prepon-
derance of evidence." Still others have adopted a "clear 
and convincing evidence" standard, a standard also 
found in the IJA-ABA Standards. See S. Davis, Rights of 
Juveniles 4-17 (2d ed 1980}. IJA-ABA Standards at 39. 
Evidence 
In many jurisdictions the rules of evidence are relaxed 
-·· 
in transfer hearings because. these hearings are con-
sidered dispositional in nature. See S. Davis, Rights of 
Juveniles 4-17 (2d ed 1980). But see In re Anonymous, 14 
Ariz App 466, 484 P(2d) 235 (1971) (only competent evi-
dence admissible); In re Harris, 218 Kan 625, 544 P(2d) 
1403 (1976) (transfer may not be based on inadmissible 
hearsay); People v Morris, 57 Mich App 573, 226 NW(2d) 
565, cert. denied, 423 US 849 (1975) (only legally admis-
sible evidence may be introduced). 
At least as a general rule, however, in Ohio the rules of 
evidence appear to apply in transfer hearings. Evidence 
Rule 101 provides that the Rules of Evidence "govern 
proceedings in the courts of this state and before court-
appointed referees of this state .... "Accordingly, the 
Rules of Evidence apply in transfer hearings. There is, 
however, an important exception. Evidence Rule 
101(C)(6) exempts from the Rules of Evidence pro-
ceedings in which other rules prescribed by the Ohio 
Supreme Court govern evidentiary matters. Thus, where 
the Rules of Evidence are in conflict with any other rule 
prescribed by the Supreme Court, the "other rule" pre-
vails. For example, Juvenile Rule 32(A)(2) expressly per-
mits the use of a social history in transfer proceedings, 
although much of the material contained in a social 
history would be inadmissible under the Rules of Evi-
dence. Juvenile Rule 2(21) defines the social history as 
"the personal and family history of a child or any other 
party to a juvenile proceeding and may include the prior 
record of the person with the juvenile court or any other 
court." 
Prior to the adoption of the Rules of Evidence, the Ohio 
Supreme Court had upheld the use of a social history at 
a transfer hearing, despite its hearsay character. State v 
Carmichael, 35 OS(2d) 1, 298 NE(2d) 568 (1973), cert. 
denied, 414 US 1161 (1974). See also State v Riggins, 68 
App(2d) 1, 7, 426 NE(2d) 504,509 (1980) ("The Ohio 
Supreme Court has held that hearsay evidence is ad-
missible at a relinquishment proceeding in Juvenile 
Court in the form of psychiatric reports from the Ohio 
Youth Commission Juvenile Diagnostic Center."). In Car-
michael, however, the Court also indicated that the 
psychiatrists and psychologists whose opinions ap-
peared in the social history could have been called as 
witnesses: "[T]hey were never called, nor was any effort 
made to call them by defense counsel, even though 
counsel had access to those documents for more than 
two months prior to the hearing." 35 OS(2d) at 3-4. 
The issue of whether the right of confrontation applies 
at a transfer hearing was raised in State v. Riggin·s, 68 
App(2d) 1, 426 NE(2d) 504 (1989). In that case, the de-
fendant contended that he was denied due process be-
cause he was deprived of the opportunity to confront the 
witnesses against him, i.e., the confession of a codefen-
dant was read into evidence by a police officer. The court 
overruled this objection because the defendant failed to 
provide a transcript to support his allegations. /d. at 7-8. 
Under Evidence Rule 801, the confession of a codefen-
dant is-inadmissible hearsay. 
Self-Incrimination 
The privilege against self-incrimination applies in 
transfer hearings. REM v State, 532 SW(2d) 645, 648 (Tex 
Civ App 1975). In In re Gault, 387 US 1, 55 (1967), the U.S. 
Supreme Court held the privilege applicable to adjudica-
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tory hearings, and in other cases the Court has stated 
that the privilege is applicable in any proceeding "civil or 
criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might 
incriminate (a person] in future criminal proceedings." 
Lefkowitz v Turley, 414 US 70, 77 (1973). The Court has 
also held that a criminal defendant's exercise of his right 
to remain silent may not be commented upon or used 
against him at trial. Griffin v California, 380 US 609 
(1965). See also In re Jackson, 21 OS(2d) 215, 220-21, 
257 NE(2d) 74, 78 (1970) (no Griffin violation found). 
By testifying at a transfer hearing, the child waives the 
privilege against self-incrimination. Whether the child's 
statement may be later used at a criminal trial or at an ad-
judicatory hearing is unclear. If his statements may be us-
ed against him at a later time, the child is placed in an 
untenable position. He either must give up the privilege 
or his right to be heard at the transfer hearing. The U.S. 
Supreme Court considered an analogous situation in 
Simmons v. United States, 390 US 377 (1968), which 
involved a similar choice facing criminal defendants in 
supression hearings: 
Thus, in this case [the defendant] was obliged either to 
give up what he believed, with advice of counsel, to be a 
valid Fourth Amendment claim or, in legal effect, to waive his 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In 
these circumstances, we find it intolerable that one constitu-
tional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert 
another. We therefore hold that when a defendant testifies in 
support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amend-
ment grounds, his testimony may not thereafter be admitted 
against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no 
objection. /d. at 394. 
Several courts have applied this reasoning to transfer 
hearings: "(C)andid testimony by the juvenile at the 
fitness hearing should be encouraged to aid in the deter-
mination of where best to try the minor; fairness to the 
minor requires that this testimony not be given at the ex-
pense of the privilege against self-incrimination." Sheila 
0 v Superior Court, 125 Cal App(3d) 812, 816-17, 178 Cal 
Rptr 418, 420 (1981). Accordingly, statements made at 
transfer hearings have been held inadmissible at subse-
quent criminal trials and adjudicatory hearings. Ramona 
R v Superior Court, 210 Cal Rptr 204 (Cal 1985); Bryan v 
Superior Court, 7 Cal(3d) 575, 586-87, 498 P(2d) 1079, 
1087, 102 Cal Rptr 831, 839-40 (1972), cert. denied, 410 
US 944 (1973); Commonwealth v Ransom, 446 Pa 457, 
467-68, 288 A(2d) 762, 767 (1972); Sheila 0 v Superior 
Court, 125 Cal App(3d) 812, 816-17, 178 Cal Rptr 418, 420 
(1981) (except for impeachment). see also IJA-ABA Stan-
dards at 50-51 (1980). 
Access to Reports 
Juvenile Rule 32(C) provides for the right to inspect a 
social history or report of a mental or physical exam-
ination a reasonable time prior to the transfer hearing. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Kent held that counsel had a 
right of access to social service records. The Court left 
no doubt that the right of inspection was intended to per-
mit counsel to challenge the accuracy of these reports: 
[l]f the staff's submissions include materials which are sus-
ceptible to challenge or impeachment, it is precisely the role 
of counsel to "denigrate" such matter. There is no irrebut-
table presumption of accuracy attached to staff reports. If a 
decision on waiver is "critically important" it is equally of 
"critical importance" that the material submitted to the 
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judge ... be subjected ... to examination, criticism and 
refl:itation.Wnile'ttieJoveHiilercounjUdge rnay, ofcourse, 
receive ex parte analyses and recommendations from his 
staff1 b,ei!I!:!Y}'l_()l,f()rthe purp()§es of a decision on waiver, 
receive and rely upon secret information, whether emana-
ting from his staff or otherwise. 383 US at 563. 
Rule 32(C) grants the court authority to deny or limit 
inspection for go9d cause. Th,e, Po!-lrt llll:!Y also order that 
the contents of the report be withheld from specified per-
sons. The court, ho~.Vever, must state reasons for its 
action. 
Right to Present Evidence 
Although the Juveni le-Rules-do-not-specifically,recog-
nize a child's rightto present evidence at a transfer hear-
ing, there seems little question that this right exists. See 
Summers v State,2~~ lnq~5J,5(:3Q,~30NE(2d) 320,325 
(1967); In re Brown, 183 NW(2d) 731, 733 (Iowa 1971); In 
re Doe, 86 NM 37, 38,519 P(2d)133, 134(1974). The right 
to counsel, the right to notice, and' the right of access to 
the social history all imply a right to present evidence. In 
a different context, the U.S. Supreme Court has com-
mented: "Ordinarily, the righito present evidence is 
basic to a fair hearing .... "Wolff v McDonnell, 418 US 
539, 566 (1974). The Ohio Supreme Court has implicitly 
recognized this right. In one case the Court commented 
on a defens~ counsel's failure to make any effort to call 
witnesses at a transfer hearing. State v. Carmichael, 35 
OS(2d) 1, 298 NE(2d) 568 (1973), cert. denied, 414 US 
1161 (1974). See also State vYoss, 10 App(2d) 47, 50,225 
NE(2d) 275, 277-78 (1967) (Kent requires the Juvenile 
Court to consider additional evidence offered by a 
juvenile in a transfer hearing). 
Statement of Reasons 
- . -··--··----···----·--··-
RC 2151.26(F) and Juvenile Rule 30 (G) require the 
court to state reasons if it decides to transfer the child. 
The u.s. Suprem-e' ca'uri"inkent aiso.required a-state-
ment of the reasons: 
Meaningful review requires that the reviewing court 
should review. It should not be remitted to assumptions. It 
must have before it a statement of the reasons motivating 
the waiver including, of course, a statement of the relevant 
facts. It may not "assume" thatthere are adequatefreasons, 
nor may it merely assume that "full investigation" has been 
made. Accordingly, we hold that it is incumbent upon the 
Juvenile Court to accompany its waiver order with a state-
ment of the reasons or considerations therefore.' We do not 
read the statute a~ requiring that this statement must be 
formal or tf1~t it s_holll9 n'rc::e.ss11rily ipclude conventional 
findings offacU3ut tile statemenfstiould be sufiic1Emt to 
demonstrate that the statutory requirement of "full investi-
gation" has been met; and that the question has received 
the careful consideration of the Juvenile Court; and it must 
set forth the basis for the order with sufficient specificity to 
permit meaningful review. 383 US at 561. 
The Ohio courts are divided over th1s requirement. In 
State v. Oviedo, 5 App(3d) 168, 450NE(2d) 700 (1982), 
the court held that Rule 30(G) is satisfied if the transfer 
order demonstrates that the "full investigation" require-
ment has been met and the issue has received the full 
attention of the court. In contrast, the court in State v. 
Newton, No. F-82-17 (6th Dist Ct App, Fulton, 6-10-83), 
required more: 
Mere recitation of the conclusory language set forth in 
Juv. R. 30(C)(1) and (2) is not sufficient. Conclusions are not 
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reasons, as contemplated by Juv. R. 30 (G). The "reason-
able grounds" for the court's belief that a juvenile is not 
amenable to rehabilitation and that the community's safety 
may require his legal restraint must be spelled out with 
reasonable specificity. Stated differently, Juv. R. 30(G) 
necessitates findings of fact from which to determine the ~ 
prerequisites in Juv. R. 30(C)(1) and (2) and upon which to 'fJ 
base the transfer order. /d. at 7. 
See also State v Reuss, No. WD-81-26 (6th Dist Ct App, 
Wood, 8-7-81) (bare recitation of factors in Juv A 30(E) is 
insufficient). Courts in other jurisdictions have also in-
sisted upon specific reasons for transfer. See Summers v 
State, 248lnd 551,569-70,230 NE(2d) 320, 325 {1967); 
RisnervCommonwealth, 508 SE(2d) 775 (Ky 1974); In re 
Heising, 29 Or App 903, 907-08, 565 P(2d) 1105, 1107 
(1977); Knott v Langlois, 102 Rl517, 524,231 A(2d) 767, 
770 (1967). See also IJA-ABA Standards at 33-34. 
Right to a Transcript 
Juvenile Rule 37(A) provides for the right to a complete 
record of ali juVenile court hearings upon request. More-
over, one Ohio court, citing due process and equal pro-
tection grounds, has held that an indigent juvenile has a 
right to a transcript in transfer proceedings. State v Ross, 
23 App(2d) 215,216-17, 262 NE(2d) 427, 429 (1970). The 
importance of a transcript is illustrated by State v. Rig-
gins, 68 App(2d) 1, 426 NE(2d) 504 (1980), in which the 
appellate court overruled an alleged error at a transfer 
hearing because the "appellant has failed to provide this 
court with a transcript of the hearing before the Juvenile 
Court at which this evidence was presented." /d. at 7-8, 
426 NE(2d) at 509. See also F. Bailey & H. Rothblatt, 
Handling Juvenile Delinquency Cases 183 (1982) ("insist 
that the proceedings be transcribed"). C 
POST-TRANSFER ISSUES 
Retention of Jurisdiction 
If the juvenile court decides to retain jurisdiction, it 
must schedule a hearing on the merits. Juv A 30(D). One 
court has stated that a juvenile judge is not disqualified 
from presiding at an adjudicatory hearing because of his 
involvement in a prior transfer hearing. In re Terry H, 1 
OBR 377, 378 (CP 1982). In contrast, the IJA-ABA Stan-
dards recognize a child's right to disqualify the transfer 
hearing judge from -participating in subsequent pro-
ceedings: "No matter how fair the waiver judge may be in 
subsequent proceedings, an impression of unfairness 
will exist." IJA-ABA Standards at 52. See also Donald L. v 
Superior Court, 7 Cal(3d) 592,598, 498 P(2d) 1098, 1101, 
102 Cal Rptr 850, 853 (1972) ("[l]f the referee or judge 
who hears the issue of fitness decides that the minor 
should be retained in the juvenile court, he may not 
thereafter properly preside at a contested hearing on the 
issue of jurisdiction."). 
Transfer of Jurisdiction 
If the juvenile court decides to transfer jurisdiction, 
it will set the terms and conditions for release of the child 
in accordance with Criminal Rule 46. Juv A 30(H).If the 
child is in detention he may be transferred to the appro-
priate officer or detention facility in accordance with the 41 
law governing the detention of adults. RC 2151.312(A). ~ 
The criminal court to which jurisdiction has been trans-
ferred may not "review the factual findings of the juvenile 
court on the issue of amenability." State v Whiteside, 6 
App(3d) 30,36-37,452 NE(2d) 332,339 (1982). 
RC 2151.26(F) provides that "transfer abates the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court with respect to the de-
linquent acts alleged in the complaint." This provision 
appears to require that the juvenile court transfer juris-
diction over all delinquent acts before these acts can be 
prosecuted in the·criminal courts. In State v. Adams, 69 
· OS(2d) 120, 431 NE(2d) 326 (1982), however, the Ohio 
Supreme Court ruled otherwise. According to the Court, 
once a child is properly transferred, he is considered 
bound over for all felonies, even if the other felonies have 
notbeen subject to transfer proceedings. /d. at 126~27. 
Moreover, once transferred, a child may be tried in the 
criminal courts for any subsequent felonies that he has 
committed. /d. RC 2151.26(G) now provides that once 
transferred and convicted, a child is automatically sub-
ject to criminal court jurisdiction for subsequent charges 
of aggravated murder, murder, an aggravated felony of 
the first or second degree, or felonies of the first or se-
cond degree. This provision was not applicable at the 
time the child in Adams was transferred. 69 OS(2d) at 
126-27 n.3. 
Once a child is transferred, a grand jury may indict for 
any offense appropriate under the facts; the grand jury is 
not limited to the charges filed in juvenile court. /d. at 
124-25 (a grand jury does not exceed its authority by 
returning indictments on charges which were not origin-
ally filed in juvenile court); State v Klingenberger, 113 OS 
418, 425, 149 NE 395, 397 (1925). Moreover, a criminal 
defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial does not 
commence until the juvenile court relinquishes jurisdic-
tion. State ex rei Williams v Court of Common Pleas, 42 
OS(2d) 433,434, 329 NE(2d) 680, 681 (1975); State v 
Steele, 8 App(3d) 137,8 OBR 194,456 NE(2d) 513 (1982); 
State v Trapp, 52 App(2d) 189, 368 NE(2d) 1278, 1279-80 
(1977); State v Young, 44 App(2d) 387, 388, 339 NE(2d) 
668, 669 (1975). In addition, a defendant is entitled to 
good time credit for the time spent in juvenile custody. 
State v Young, 44 App(2d) 387, 388-89, 339 NE(2d) 668, 
669-70 (1975). By pleading guilty in criminal court, a 
defendant does not waive the right to contest the validity 
of the transfer decision. State v Riggins, 68 App(2d) 1, 
4-5,426 NE(2d) 504,507-08 (1980). 
APPEALS 
In Ohio a juvenile court order transferring jurisdiction 
to the criminal courts is not a final appealable order. In re 
Becker, 39 OS(2d) 84, 314 NE(2d) 158 (1974). Accord 
State ex rei Torres v Simmons, 68 OS(2d) 118, 428 NE(2d) 
862 (1981}; State v Whiteside, 6 App(3d) 30, 6 OBR 140, 
452 NE(2d) 332 (1982). See generally Comment, Juvenile 
Court and Direct Appeal from Waiver of Jurisdiction in 
Ohio, 8 Akron L Rev 499 (1975). Thus, a transfer order 
may be challenged on appeal only after trial and convic-
tion in the criminal courts. Simlarly, a writ of prohibition 
may not be used to challenge a transfer order. State ex 
rei Torres v Simmons, 68 OS(2d) 118, 428 NE(2d) 862 
(1981). Although a number of jurisdictions permit appeals 
of transfer orders, the Ohio rule appears to be the majori-
ty rule. See IJA-ABA Standards 53. 
The Ohio Supreme Court has provided the following 
reasons for its position: 
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To permit interlocutory review of such an order would ob-
viously delay the prosecution of any proceeding in either the 
juvenile or the criminal division, with the result that the pro-
spect of a just disposition would be jeopardized.ln either 
proceeding. the primarY issue is the ascertainment of inno-
cence or guilt of the person charged. To permit interlocutory 
review would subordinate that primary issue and defer its 
consideration while the question of the punishment appro-
priate for a suspect whose guilt has not yet been ascertain-
ed is being litigated in reviewing courts. We are unwilling to 
sanction such a procedure. In re Becker, 39 OS(2d) 84, 86, 
314 NE(2d) 158, 159(1974) (quoting People v Jiles, 43 111(2d) 
145, 150, 251 NE(2d) 529, 531 (1969)). 
There is, however, a serious disadvantage to this rule. 
The time consumed during the prosecution of the case in 
criminal court and during the appellate process may 
place the defendant beyond the age jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court. In this event, an appellate court that finds 
error in a transfer proceeding must either free the im-
properly transferred individual, because neither juvenile 
nor criminal court has jurisdiction, or reconstruct the 
transfer process to determine whether a hearing free 
from error would have resulted in transfer. IJA-ABA Stan-
dards at 53. The Kent case illustrates this problem. By 
the time the U.S. Supreme Court reversed Morris Kent's 
conviction, he was over 21 years of age and thus no 
longer subject to juvenile court jurisdiction. The Court 
remanded the case to the District Court for a de novo 
consideration of the transfer issue, i.e., a reconstructed 
waiver hearing. 383 US at 564-65. The difficulty with this 
procedure is that the reconstructed hearing must "at-
tempt to imagine" the child as he was at the time of the 
original transfer hearing. IJA-ABA Standards at 53. 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
In Breed v. Jones, 421 US 519 (1975), the U.S. 
Supreme Court reviewed a California procedure that per-
mitted transfer after a child had been found delinquent in 
an adjudicatory hearing. The Court held that this pro-
cedure violated the double jeopardy clause: "We believe 
it is simply too late in the day to conclude ... that a 
juvenile is not put in jeopardy at a proceeding whose ob-
ject is to determine whether he has committed acts that 
violate a criminal law and whose potential consequences 
include both the stigma inherent in such a determination 
and the deprivation of liberty for many years." /d. at 529. 
In a footnote, however, the Court distinguished the 
California procedure from a transfer procedure requiring 
only a finding of probable cause: "We note that nothing 
decided today forecloses States from requiring, as a 
prerequisite to the transfer of a juvenile, substantial evi-
dence that he committed the offense charged, so long as 
the showing required is not made in an adjudicatory pro-
ceeding .... The instant case is not one in which the 
judicial determination was simply a find of, e.g., probable 
cause. Rather, it was an adjudication that respondent 
had violated a criminal statute." /d. at 538 n.18. 
In Sims v. Engle, 619 F(2d) 598 (6th Cir 1980), cert. 
denied, 450 US 936 (1981), the Sixth Circuit held that the 
Ohio procedure operative in that case suffered from the 
same deficiencies that marked the California procedure 
in Breed. Under that procedure a juvenile court was re-
quired to make a delinquency finding prior to transfer. 
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In reJack.Son; 21 OS(2d) 215, 257 NE(2d) 74 (1970). Ac-
cording to the Sixth Circuit, this procedure violated the 
doubletjeopatdy·guarantee: "Once the Juvenile Court, 
pos5essirig the jurisdiction and power to enter final orders 
levying a wide. range of possible sanctions, began a hear-
ing, not limited in scope by statute to a preliminary hear-
ing or probable cause hearing, jeopardy attached and ap-
pellant possessed the constitutional right to have the 
Juvenile Court, as the original trier of fact, determine his 
fate." 619 F(2d) at 605. See also Johnson v Perini, 644 
F(2d) 573 (6th Cir 1981) (Sims does not apply if the 
recoftfplaihly esta51isheertliafttil:rtraf1sfeniearing was 
limited to a probable cause determination). 
The statute that the SiXth Circuit found constitutionally 
defective in Sims has sillce tieen amended. Unlike the 
8 
former procedure, the present transfer procedure requires 
only a finding of probable cause and not a determination 
of delinquency. The Sixth Circuit has upheld the constitu-
tionality of this procedure: ''We reject the contention that 
the introduction of evidence of dprobable c~uhse to believe 4 
appellant committed the allege offense w1t out more, 
transformed the hearing into an adjudicatory proceeding:• 
Keener v Taylor, 640 F(2d) 839, 841-42 (6th Cir 1981). Ac-
cord State v Salmon, No 43328 & 43329 (8th Dist Ct 
App, Cuyahoga, 5-21-81). 
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